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I. INTRODUCTION
This Note presents a discussion of the effect of binding arbitration
agreements in contracts for medical services and an analysis of whether
these provisions should be held to bind nonsignators to such agreements.
Bolanos v. Khalatian,1 decided in June of 1991 by the second division of
California's state appellate courts, presents a factual situation well suited
to an analysis of binding arbitration agreements in medical service
contracts and their effect on children of the signator, the signator's spouse,
and the signator herself. This Note analyzes the conflicting reasoning of
the California state appellate courts applied in determining the scope of
arbitration agreements in medical service contracts. Also presented is the
genesis of case law and policy that has given rise to a statute providing for
the contractual binding to arbitration of claims arising out of the provision
of medical services. In part, this paper is intended to provide an objective
analysis of case law surrounding a specific example of tort reform enacted
in the midst of the 1970's medical malpractice crisis. The present lull
following the 1980's crisis affords an opportunity to examine the reasoning
and effects of some of the legislative and judicial responses to the medical
malpractice crises this nation periodically experiences.
Following the introduction, Part Two of this paper provides a
brief economic and historical background to the enactment of the
California binding arbitration statute. Part Three discusses the facts,
procedural history, and resolution of Bolanos v. Khalatian. The plaintiffs
in Bolanos are Ms. Bolanos, Mr. Bolanos, and their child, Tatiana. The
claims of Ms. Bolanos and Tatiana are considered in light of current
California law. Part Four separately considers Mr. Bolanos' claim and
analyzes the reasoning behind the rules regarding the scope of arbitration
agreements in California. Further, Part Four presents a summary of the
arguments for and against the inclusion of nonsignator claims within the
arbitration statute in conjunction with an appeal by the author that certain
types of nonsignator clainis not be subject to arbitration. The Conclusion
suggests a legal and policy oriented method for determining whether to
include nonsignator claims within the binding arbitration provisions in
medical service contracts.
1. Bolanos v. Khalatian, 283 Cal. Rptr. 209 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1991).
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I. ECONOMIC AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CRISES
A. The National Malpractice Crises
The United States has experienced a series of medical malpractice
crises over the previous two decades which have generated responses from
both the courts and the legislatures.' A cyclical pattern marked by
recurring crises characterizes the medical malpractice insurance industry.
During profitable periods, insurers are likely to write more policies, take
greater risks, and compete for market share through competitive pricing.
As the cycle continues, profit margins erode and losses increase as more
competitors enter the market place and/or the existing insurers erode their
own margins to capture greater market share. Eventually, the insurers
respond by imposing greater discipline through restricting policy issuances,
raising premiums, combining these responses, or exiting the marketplace.
At this point a crisis of availability or affordability occurs. However, the
actions taken by the insurers that result in the crisis also lead to a more
profitable period, thus beginning the cycle once again.3  The United
States has experienced two major crises in recent history.
1. The Crisis of the 1970s
The relatively high likelihood of a physician being named a
defendant in a malpractice suit is a fairly recent development. The
American Medical Association (AMA) has estimated that as recently as the
late 195 0s only one doctor in seven faced a claim of malpractice during his
or her entire career.4  Policymakers first took note of the insurance
coverage concerns of medical care providers in the late 1960s because the
insurers and medical professionals voiced their distress over the rising
frequency of claims and costs of insurance. The federal government took
two steps to address the situation. Congress held hearings, and, in 1971,
President Nixon directed the creation of a study commission. The
investigation revealed no crisis.'
By 1974, however, a crisis in the malpractice system was clearly
evident. The frequency of malpractice claims, which had risen moderately
2. Randall Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a
Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 499 (1989).
3. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1OIST CONG., 2D SESS., MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, 49 (Comm. Print 1990).
4. Bovbjerg, supra note 2.
5. Id. at 502.
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through the 1960s, turned sharply upward in the 1970s. Some of the
reasons for this sharp upturn in the number of claims include
developments in medical technology, increases in the degree of
urbanization and in the number of physicians, and pro-plaintiff changes in
legal doctrine adopted by the courts just prior to 1970.6
The crisis of the mid-1970s is frequently referred to as a crisis of
insurance availability. A number of insurers decided to drop their
malpractice business, leaving health care providers with few alternatives,
if any, when choosing insurance coverage. The decrease in supply,
coupled with a constant or increasing demand, resulted in dramatic
premium increases, and created an affordability crisis.7 Several major
changes8 resulted from the crisis of the 1970s, including the change from
occurrence to claims-made malpractice policies, the creation of Joint
Underwriting Associations (JUAs), and statutory arbitration provisions
such as the one enacted in California.' Slower rates of growth in
insurance premiums resulted from the changes implemented to combat the
6. Id. at n.12.
7. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 49 (Comm. Print 1990).
8. The following is a discussion of some of the important developments. First, state
legislatures or insurance commissioners began requiring insurers to report their experience
with malpractice insurance separately from other lines of business. Second, Joint
Underwriting Associations (JUA) were developed. The typical JUA is a state-overseen
insurance pool in which all of the states's liability insurers are required to participate, but for
which a single carrier conducts business much like a conventional company. Unlike a
conventional insurer, however, a JUA has special statutory guarantees of solvency that enable
it to accept all or nearly all applicants for coverage.
Third, and most significant to the insurers themselves, the system of writing
insurance changed from occurrence-based to claims-made underwriting. This development
was pioneered by the St. Paul Group, the leading commercial malpractice carrier.
Traditional "occurrence" policies pay for any claim resulting from an occurrence in the
policy year, no matter how long afterwards the claim is brought. These policies result in a
long tail of hard-to-predict claims payments that continue for many years after the premiums
are collected. "Claims-made" policies, as the name implies, cover only claims made during
the policy year. Uncertainty about unreported, incurred claims is eliminated. While this
helps rate projections, uncertainty still remains about how long it will take to settle cases and
the cost of these cases. Today, "claims-made" coverage is almost universal even among
physician-owned companies.
Fourth, many new "captive" insurance companies were created by groups of
physicians or by medical and hospital associations to assure that their members would have
continued coverage available regardless of the commercial profitability of malpractice
insurance. Finally, many states adopted a variety of malpractice reform measures to limit the
frequency and severity of malpractice claims such as arbitration requirements for medical
malpractice claims. See generally'supra note 2.
9. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
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mid-1970's crisis. Insurance companies once again began to compete for
market share. A number of the insurers engaged in cash flow
underwriting, pricing their malpractice premiums below actuarially
indicated levels, and relying on the record high rates of investment returns
available in the late 1970s to sustain these low premiums.
2. The Crisis of the 1980s
In the early 1980s, problems again arose in the malpractice
insurance industry. This crisis was more one of affordability than of
availability because the captive insurance companies formed during the
1970's crisis assured coverage availability. Although these insurers were
committed to remaining in the market to provide coverage, their rates still
rose rapidly." The 1980's crisis differed from that of the 1970s in that it
was more widespread, with the problems of non-medical insureds holding
center stage. Municipalities, liquor stores, day care centers, and other
seekers of liability insurance all found coverage expensive, if they could
obtain it at all. 1 The 1980's crisis resulted in further adoption of
liability reform proposals.'
Recently, discussion of malpractice reform has again surfaced at
the federal level. The Bush Administration in particular advocated caps on
damages and mandatory arbitration of malpractice claims, along with
worker's compensation-style damage schedules. Withholding or granting a
percentage of federal Medicare funds to the states, depending upon their
compliance with the Administration's desires, would encourage these
reforms.'
B. California's Response to the Malpractice Crisis of the 1970s
As a response to the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s,
Governor Edmund G. "Jerry" Brown of California convened a special
session of the California legislature "to deal exclusively with the
10. Richard Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 37, 48 (Spring 1986).
11. Bovbjerg, supra note 2, at 503.
12. As the crisis was of broader scope than the 1970's crisis, these reforms often
covered tort law generally and were not limited to medical liability. The main insurance
reforms of the 1980s came at the federal level rather than in the states. Congress passed the
Risk Retention Act in 1981 to assist insureds who sought products liability coverage. This
statute allows insureds to come together and purchase group policies or to self-insure. In
1986 Congress expanded the statute to cover medical malpractice.
13. See I PUBLIC PAPERs 513 (May 15, 1991).
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formulation of a legislative solution to the [malpractice] 'crisis. ' ""' The
Governor requested that the legislature consider "[v]oluntary binding
arbitration in order to quickly and fairly resolve malpractice claims while
maintaining fair access to the courts."' This special session of the
legislature passed the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA),"' one part of which is § 1295 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure.17
Section 1295 allows any contract for medical services to include a
binding arbitration provision for any claims arising out of the delivery of
medical services. Section 1295 specifically sets forth the format and
wording necessary to comply with the statute.18 The statute also provides
that just before the signature line for the person seeking to contract for the
medical services, the following must appear in at least 10-point bold red
type: "NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE
AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING
UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1
OF THIS CONTRACT."'9
Compliance with the statute has several benefits - the primary
benefit being that any malpractice claims are submitted to arbitration and
the physician avoids the stigma of a public trial. Another benefit is
provided to the physician by subsection (e), which states that "such a
[medical services] contract [providing for binding arbitration for all
malpractice claims] is not a contract of adhesion, nor unconscionable nor
otherwise improper, where it complies with (a), (b), and (c) of this
section. ""
MICRA was intended to reduce the problems inherent in
traditional medical malpractice litigation. Recent empirical studies have
shown that the traditional tort system does not provide for the economic
14. Gross v. James A. Recabaren, 253 Cal. Rptr. 820, 822 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988)
(citing 7 PAC. L.J. 545 (1976)). The crisis of the 1970s was a crisis of availability of
malpractice coverage, as opposed to the affordaiility problems of the 1980s. For a complete
discussion of the statutory responses to the malpractice crises see generally Bovbjerg, supra
note 2, at 499.
15. Gross, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 822. (citing GOVERNOR'S PROCLAMATION TO LEG. (May,
16, 1975), 10 Senate J. (1975-1976 2d Ex. Sess.) at 2).
16. Medical Injury CompensationReform Act, chs. 1, 2, 9.1 Cal. Stat. § 1295 (1975).
17. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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damages of the most severely injured patients. 21 At the same time the
least severe injuries are often overcompensated.' Arbitration is seen as
possibly providing a mechanism for more accurately determining adequate
compensation while reducing the transaction costs inherent in traditional
litigation.'
Another possible purpose behind the introduction of arbitration
into the adjudication of medical malpractice claims is that an enormous
amount of legitimate malpractice claims are never filed, perhaps due to the
time and expense involved in traditional litigation." Also, arbitration can
be a less hostile environment for the settlement of disputes when the
parties desire a continuing relationship. 2 However, it must be
questioned whether the enactment of arbitration statutes, even binding
ones, simply introduces another procedural step in the resolution of
malpractice disputes, thereby increasing the time and expense involved in
the resolution of claims.'
21. Frank A. Sloan and Stephen van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in
Medical Malpractice, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (winter 1991); Frank A. Sloan and
Chee R. Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24
LAw & Soc'y REv. 997 (1990).
22. Frank A. Sloan and Stephen van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in
Medical Malpractice, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (winter 1991); Frank A. Sloan and
Chee R. Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24
LAW & Soc'y REV. 997 (1990).
23. See generally Catherine S. Meschievitz, Mediation and Medical Malpractice:
Problems with Definition and Implementation, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 195 (Winter
1991).
24. Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient
Compensation in New York, THE REPORT OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO
THE STATE OF N.Y. (1990).
25. Meschievitz, supra note 23, at 198.
26. In the chart in Part IV(D), infra, eight cases are presented to show the development
of case law regarding binding arbitration provisions in contracts for medical services. It is
worth noting that the arbitration provision involved in each of these cases resulted in the
additional procedural step of litigation to determine which parties the arbitration provision
affected.
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Im. BOLANOS V. KHALATIAN
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
On October 5, 1988, Inez Chavez (Ms. Bolanos)z  initially
visited Dr. Khalatian for obstetric care and treatment when she was
approximately twenty-five weeks pregnant.' During this initial visit,
Ms. Chavez was provided a contract for medical services containing a
provision for arbitration of all claims arising out of the medical
services.' This provision was in compliance with §1295 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure.3" Ms. Chavez could not read
English and was provided a Spanish version of the agreement which she
signed and dated. Mr. Bolanos was unaware of the binding arbitration
provision and was not a signator to the contract for medical services.
From October 5, 1988, until the delivery of Tatiana Bolanos, Dr.
Khalatian regularly checked the progress of Inez Chavez' pregnancy.31
On December 16, 1988, Dr. Khalatian delivered Tatiana and allegedly,
either shortly before or during delivery, injured Tatiana's arm.3'
Mr. Bolanos, Inez Chavez, and Tatiana brought their separate
claims in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, where Dr.
Khalatian's motion to stay further proceedings and compel arbitration was
denied.' The four causes of action brought in the lower court were
identified by the court as:
i. Tatiana's claim for general negligence.
ii. Ms. Bolanos' claim for general negligence.
iii. Ms. Bolanos' claim for negligent infliction of
27. The use of different last names by both parties is somewhat confusing. It is not
clear from the opinion of the Appellate Court why Inez Chavez and Jose Bolanos are
identified by different last names. The opinion does indicate that Jose Bolanos was also
identified in the record as Jose Chavez. Regardless, Tatiana is identified as the daughter of
Jose Bolanos and Inez Chavez. For the sake of consistency Inez Chavez/Bolanos will
hereafter be identified as Ms. Bolanos.
28. Bolanos, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Meschievitz, supra note 23.
32. Bolanos, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 210. The arm injured is not specified in the Appellate
Court decision. However, from speaking to one of the defense attorneys involved in the trial
portion of the case, it was discovered that the injury was to the child's right shoulder, it did
not involve laceration, and Tatiana had fully recovered from her injuries.
33. Id. at 209.
34. Id. at 210.
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emotional distress.
iv. Jose Bolanos' claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.'
The Superior Court denied Dr. Khalatian's motion to compel
arbitration, stating that it could not "say by a preponderance of the
evidence or even a lower standard of convincing evidence that the waiver
[of Ms. Bolanos' right to litigate] was executed in a knowing and
intelligent fashion."36  The court also stated that it "[could not] see how
an agreement for arbitration can affect third parties" in regard to Mr.
Bolanos and Tatiana. Dr. Khalatian then appealed the lower court's
decision to the Second District of the California Court of Appeals, which
held that the claims of all three persons were bound to arbitration." An
analysis of Ms. Bolanos' and Tatiana's claims, the appellate court's
reasoning, and applicable law are discussed in the following section.
B. The Claims of Ms. Bolanos and Tatiana
The causes of action set forth by Ms. Bolanos are stated by the
Second District of the California Court of Appeals as claims for "general
negligence" and "negligent infliction of emotional distress."' It was
clear to the court that her claims were bound by the arbitration agreement.
Her declaration did not assert that she could not read or understand the
agreement, only that she was able to read "only limited Spanish." Nor did
Ms. Bolanos assert that she was duped into signing the agreement. 39  Ms.
Bolanos did not enter into the agreement in an emergency, which could
have made analysis under adhesion contract rules appropriate.'4 Both
35. Id. at 209.
36. Id. at 211.
37. Id. at 212.
38. Id. at 210. See supra text accompanying note 35.
39. Id. at211.
40. The Bolanos court states that "[t]here is no suggestion that her condition was such
that she required immediate medical attention or that she involuntarily signed the documents
in order to receive any urgent medical treatment." Bolanos, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 211, 212.
This seems to suggests at least a possibility for a party, even the signator to the contract, to
avoid the contract through a duress, undue influence, adhesion, or some similar claim. This
appears at odds with the clear statutory language of § 1295(e), which states "[s]uch a contract
is not a contract of adhesion, nor unconscionable nor othervise improper, where it complies
with subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of this section."
However, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) contain nothing which would prevent an
arbitration agreement from being properly executed in compliance with the statute even in a
situation where the services are immediately necessary and of an emergency nature as long as
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§1295, with its terminology indicating that compliance with the statute
renders the contract not one of adhesion, and case law establishing that
one may not avoid a contract even where one did not read it,4' clearly
support binding Ms. Bolanos' claims to arbitration.
As to Tatiana's claim, precedent established by the California
Supreme Court in Doyle v. Giuliucci appears to control her claim and bind
it to arbitration.' In Doyle, April Doyle's father entered into a contract
for medical services which provided for settlement by binding arbitration
of any claim arising out of the provision of the services. April, through
her father appointed as guardian ad litem, sought to pursue her medical
malpractice claim in traditional litigation before the previously commenced
arbitration could reach a decision.
The Doyle court identified the "crucial question" as "whether the
power to enter into a contract for medical care that binds the child to
arbitrate any dispute arising thereunder is implicit in a parent's right and
duty to provide for the care of his child."' In holding that it was an
implicit parental power for parents to bind their minor children in this
manner, the court reasoned that minors might not otherwise be able to
obtain health care. Because minors have the power to disaffirm their
contracts to pay for medical services,' the court considered it unlikely
that medical groups would contract with minors.' In rendering its
decision, the California Supreme Court listed what it considered to be
"commensurate safeguards" on the parental power: "(i) that the issues not
be compromised but simply adjudicated by the arbitrators, (ii) that a
guardian ad litem must conduct the proceedings on behalf of the child, and
(iii) that both the issue of arbitrability and the award, if any, be subject to
judicial review."' Tatiana's claim appears to be clearly confined to
binding arbitration under current California law.47
the agreement is signed by the party to be bound.
41. Bolanos, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (citing Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (Ct. App. 1986)); Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 710 Cal. Rptr. 882
(1976).
42. Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d I (Cal. 1965).
43. Id. at 3.
44. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 35, 36 (West 1982).
45. Doyle, 401 P.2d at 3.
46. Id.
47. See 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Arbitration and Award § 9 (1988) for a discussion of the effect
of binding arbitration agreements on children and a brief note on Doyle.
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IV. MR. BOLANOS' CLAIM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LAW IN CALIFORNIA
A. Introduction
This section analyzes the process by which, given a variety of
factual situations, the California appellate courts have arrived at different
outcomes when addressing the issue of whether nonsignators to a contract
should be bound by binding arbitration clauses. The holding of the
Bolanos court will be discussed, the origins of its reasoning explored, and
the conflicting opinions of other California appellate opinions presented.
In discussing the genesis and development of the binding arbitration
doctrine of Bolanos, it is necessary to provide a brief summary of many of
the cases on which the Bolanos and other California appellate courts rely.
In addition to an examination of the opinions and the development of
reasoning surrounding this issue, a summary table is included at the end of
this section to provide an overview of the developments in the law. First,
however, it is necessary to examine the disposition of Mr. Bolanos' claim.
B. The Bolanos Court
As stated above, the appellate court found that Mr. Bolanos'
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was bound to arbitration
along with all other claims in the dispute.' The court considered it clear
from the language of the contract that "all parties whose claims arise out
of or are related to the treatment provided to [Ms. Bolanos] were to be
submitted to binding arbitration."49  The court then identified the
controversy, the very heart of this Note, as whether an arbitration
agreement can be applied to a person who is not a signatory to the
agreement."0  Referring to its holding in Gross v. Recabaren," the
court restated its belief that where a patient expressly contracts to submit
to arbitration any dispute of medical malpractice, and the agreement fully
complies with §1295, then "all medical malpractice claims arising out of
the services contracted for, regardless of whether they are asserted by the
48. At trial, a factual dispute existed over whether Mr. Bolanos was actually present
during the injury producing event. As the lower court decided the issue of arbitrability, and
no factual determination was made as to an element of the dispute, the appeals court was
justified in taking this existing claim and determining its arbitrability regardless of a lack of
factual determination, a subject appropriately left to the fact-finder. See supra note 32.
49. Bolanos, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (emphasis in original).
50. Id.
51. Gross, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
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patient or a third party" are bound to arbitration. '
C. The Split in Authority
In order to understand the basis of the reasoning from which the
Gross and Bolanos holdings derive, it is necessary to examine their
foundations. In the Gross case, Division Two, Second District of the
California Court of Appeals, explicitly recognized a split in California
appellate authority concerning the legitimacy of applying binding
arbitration agreements to nonsignator third parties. Two cases represent
this split: Baker v. Birnbaums  and Herbert v. Superior Court,'
decided by Divisions Four and Five, respectively, of the Second District,
California Court of Appeals.
In Herbert, the Fifth Appellate Division bound all parties,
including three adult children of the decedent, to arbitration of their
wrongful death claim. The three adult children were neither members of
the family's group health plan, nor signatories to the health plan
agreement, which included a binding arbitration provision.' In Baker,
the Fourth Division recognized the Doyle and Hawkins cases mentioned in
Herbert, but held that a spouse who had signed an agreement to arbitrate
any dispute as to medical malpractice had not bound her nonsignatory
spouse when the services for which she contracted were for herself
only.56 The Gross court decided, based upon the arguments presented in
the above cases, that Herbert provides the better rule. Bolanos was thus
an extension of the doctrine adopted by the court in Gross. The split in
authority is now evident, with Divisions Two and Five binding the
nonsignator third parties, while Division Four does not bind persons who
are not parties to the contract.
1. Herbert v. Superior Court
In order to understand the reasoning applied in Gross, it is
necessary to examine the Herbert case from which Gross adopted its
reasoning. Herbert was an action for wrongful death, brought by five
minor children of the decedent, the decedent's spouse, and three adult,
52. Bolanos, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (emphasis in original).
53. 248 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988).
54. 215 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985).
55. Id.
56. Gross v. Recabaren, 253 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988) (citing Baker
v. Bimbaum, 248 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988)).
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nonsignator children of the decedent. The health insurance contract in
Herbert, signed by the decedent, included a provision requiring
"arbitration of any claim asserted by a member, or a member's heir or
personal representative, arising from the rendition or failure to render
services under the agreement, irrespective of the legal theory upon which
the claim was asserted."' The Herbert court considered the wrongful
death claim of Ms. Herbert and the five children therein to be governed by
Hawkins v. Superior Court and Doyle v. Giuliucci, which clearly establish
that a parent can bind a minor child in an agreement for medical
services.-s
The court in Herbert also considered the issue of whether the
arbitration provision of the insurance plan agreement should be binding
upon adult heirs who were not members of the plan. The analysis of this
issue, which created the rule applied subsequently in Gross and Bolanos to
nonsignatory third parties, was arrived at by considering the following
case law and policy: 9
(a) The California Supreme Court's ruling in Madden v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals;'
(b) Mayerhoff v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.," a case which
established a wrongful death claim as a single cause of action;
(c) the policy recognized in Hawkins favoring arbitration and Hawkins'
allowance of spouse binding spouse;
(d) Doyle's binding of a minor child's claim;
(e) "railroad pass" cases which allowed a decedent to bind his heirs
without their knowledge;
(f) the fact that it would be unrealistic to have all the heirs as signators to
the health care service agreement;62
(g) other considerations, including §1295, which "evidence a legislative
57. Herbert, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
58. Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1965).
59. The discussion presented by the court in Gross was not presented in the order shown
here. The purpose of preseniing the court's analysis in this order is to indicate a combination
of what the author perceives the court was most persuaded by and a chronological
development of the case law. Note that the discussion of Doyle, a 1965 case, comes after the
discussion of Madden, a case decided in 1976, and Hawkins, decided in 1979. This order is
chosen because the facts of Herbert lead the court to rely more on Madden and Hawkins than
on Doyle. The summary at the end of this section provides a chronological development of
the law in regards to the third party binding issue.
60. 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
61. 138 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1977).
62. Herbert, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
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intent that a patient who signs an arbitration agreement may bind his heirs
to that agreement, regardless of whether the heirs are also members of the
plan."' 3
a. Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
The first step in Herbert, leading to the development of the
Bolanos rule, was to consider the California Supreme Court's decision in
Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals." In Madden, the State
Employees' Retirement System Board of Administration entered into a
medical services contract with Kaiser Foundation Health Plan containing
an arbitration clause for claims arising out of the provision of services.
Plaintiff contended that her medical malpractice claim was not bound by
the arbitration clause because the contract was one of adhesion and it
denied her constitutional right to a trial by jury.' The California
Supreme Court rejected the adhesion contract argument by noting that it
was applicable only where the parties are of unequal bargaining power,
and the stronger party has taken advantage of the weaker party." Here,
no adhesion contract existed because of the parity in bargaining power
between Kaiser and the Employees' Retirement System. The court then
dealt with the deprivation of trial by jury argument:
We shall reject, finally, plaintiff's contention that the
arbitration provision violates constitutional and statutory
provisions protecting the right to trial by jury. Persons
entering into arbitration agreements know and intend that
disputes arising under such agreements will be resolved by
arbitration, not by juries; neither decision nor'policy calls for
an explicit waiver of the parties' right to jury trial or for
express conformance with . . . the applicable procedural
statute.7
Here, the plaintiff was bound to the terms of the contract because
the Employees' Retirement Board was seen as a fiduciary of the plaintiff.
The court concluded that an agent or other fiduciary contracting on behalf
of his beneficiary, here the plaintiff, retains the authority to enter into an
63. Id. at 477.
64. Id. at 479.
65. Madden, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
66. Id. at 890.
67. Id. at 884 (emphasis added).
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agreement providing for arbitration of medical malpractice claims.'
While it appears the California Supreme Court based its decision in part
on the principal-agent relationship existing between the party contracting
and the party bound (a relationship which does not appear to exist in
Bolanos), other statements by the court provide evidence of the court's
attitude toward arbitration and its application to third parties.
In Madden, the court states, in response to amicus' request for a
rule requiring actual knowledge of the arbitration agreement in order for it
to be applicable, that such a rule "would be viable only if arbitration were
an extraordinary procedure, and one especially disadvantageous for the
beneficiary - propositions which we have rejected in Doyle and other cases
. .. . ,69 While this response, along with other statements by the court,
refers to a situation where the contracting party was considered the agent
of the bound party, it indicates that the court does not consider arbitration
to be substantially disadvantageous to the party bound.7" The question
that remains after Madden is whether a third party may be bound to an
arbitration provision in a contract for medical services, where the
contracting party is not an agent or fiduciary of the party to be bound.
This Note considers it especially important that the court, in rejecting the
plaintiff's arguments, stated that plaintiff benefitted from the board's
assertion of equal power on her behalf, enjoyed the opportunity to choose
and waived no substantive right.71
b. Mayerhoff v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
In Mayerhoff, the cause of action, like that in Herbert, was one
for wrongful death.' Mayerhoff clearly established that a single cause of
action exists in the heirs for the wrongful death of a decedent.' One
way to view a wrongful death action is that the claim for wrongful death is
a derivative claim, created by statute, which belongs to the decedent, and
is passed to his or her heirs because of the decedent's inability to bring the
68. Id. at 888 n.l1. The court was also likely persuaded to decide in this manner
because the plaintiff, like all persons covered by this medical services plan, received a
brochure from Kaiser which described the plan, including the arbitration provision, thus
providing plaintiff with actual knowledge of the arbitration provision.
69. Id.
70. In proving its point, the Court states that plaintiffs' recitation of authority holding
arbitration provisions to be an extraordinary method of resolving disputes comes only from
states other than California. Id. at 887.
71. Id. at 890.
72. Mayerhoff, 138 Cal. Rptr. 319.
73. Id.
CONTRACTS FOR MEDICAL SERVICES
action.74 The court in Herbert expresses this notion by stating that
"[a]lthough wrongful death is technically a separate statutory cause of
action in the heirs, it is in a practical sense derivative of a cause of action
in the deceased."' Thus, the court in Herbert, which involved a
wrongful death claim, considered the nature of the claim to be a single
cause of action prohibiting the "splitting of the litigation into different
tribunals where differing rulings and results could destroy the Legislature's
policy [as announced] in Mayerhoff."76
It would appear that identical reasoning is not applicable to
Bolanos. Mr. Bolanos asserts a claim for emotional distress, a separate
cause of action from the negligence claims brought by Ms. Bolanos and
Tatiana. Although the plaintiffs' claims do arise out of the alleged
negligence during the provision of medical services, no legislative policy
or judicial reasoning makes these claims inseparable.
Mr. Bolanos' claim is governed by Thing v. LaChusa,' a case
which developed the Dillon v. Legg rule for recovery in emotional
distress actions. Both Dillon and its refinement in Thing require that there
be a close relationship between the physically injured party and the person
asserting the emotional distress claim. Although neither case refers to the
claims of the physically injured party and the person asserting the
emotional distress claim as inseparable, it would seem duplicative and a
waste of judicial resources to have sepirate determinations of negligence
which could lead to inconsistent rulings on the same issues.
74. The common law recognizes no action for wrongful death. However, subsequent to
the passage of Lord Campbell's Act by the British Parliament, all American states have now
statutorily created a right to recovery for wrongful death.
Generally three types of wrongful death provisions exist. One allows recovery for
the economic benefit the survivors would have derived had the decedent lived. Another
allows an amount recoverable based upon the gravity of the defendant's fault. The third
treats recovery as if it were an asset of the decedent distributed to the survivors upon death.
22 AM. JUR. 2d § 7 (1991).
75. Herbert, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 481. Every state has adopted a wrongful death statute.
These statutes supersede the common law rule which extinguishes a civil cause of action upon
the death of the party. Wrongful death statutes provide for the heirs, administrator, or
executor to recover the economic benefit that the heirs would have received had the decedent
lived. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 127
(5th ed. 1984).
76. Herbert, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
77. 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989).
78. 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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c. Hawkins v. Superior Court
Following its discussion of Madden, Division Five, of the Second
District Court in Herbert then acknowledged that a strong judicial and
public policy exists favoring arbitration over litigation as a means of
settling disputes. 9  Notably, this policy has been recognized and
extended to wrongful death actions in Hawkins v. Superior Court,'m and
by the California legislature.t'
The Hawkins case established that spouses have the ability to
enter into health services contracts for one another as a result of their
fiduciary relationships' and their mutual obligations of care and
support.' This mutual obligation of care includes the obligation of
medical care.' 4 The Fourth District in Hawkins reasoned that since
spouses have the power to contract for medical services for one another as
a result of their relationship and mutual obligations, "implicit in that power
is the implied authority to agree for [one another] to arbitrate claims
arising out of medical malpractice."'
d. Doyle v. Giuliucci
Although it does not pertain directly to the situation involved in
Herbert, the court mentioned the Doyle6 case in order to provide
precedent for binding the minor children involved in Herbert to
arbitration. Further, Doyle is used to illustrate another situation in which
a party to a contract can bind a third party nonsignator to the terms of the
agreement.
79. Herbert, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
80. 152 Cal. Rptr. 491 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1979).
81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE, §§ 1283.1, 1295 (West 1982).
82. The idea of a fiduciary relationship existing between spouses is well recognized and
discussed in In re Cover's Estate, 204 P. 583 (Cal. 1922); Dolliver v. Dolliver, 30 P. 4 (Cal.
1892); O'Neil v. Spillane, 119 Cal. Rptr. 245 (Ct. App. 1975); Steiner v. Steiner, 325 P.2d
109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Auclair v. Auclair, 165 P.2d 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946), and
discussed in 6 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 4, pp. 4877-4878 (1974).
83. Hawkins, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
84. Id. (citing Sanderson v. Niemann, 110 P.2d 1025 (Cal. 1941) and Louie v.
Hagstrom's Food Stores, 184 P.2d 708 (Cal. Ct. App. Ist Dist. 1947)).
85. Id.
86. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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e. The Railroad Pass Cases
In order to support its decision to bind the spouse and children of
the deceased to the binding arbitration clause, the Herbert court mentioned
"some instances" where a decedent may limit or bar certain types of
claims through contract. The cases cited, as the court points out, are what
are known as "railroad pass cases."' In these cases a holder of a
railroad pass would agree, as part of the exchange for the pass, to waive
any possible claims against the railroad. Courts held this waiver to bind
the heirs of the decedent in actions for wrongful death.'
Although an analysis of limitations placed by a decedent or post-
death claims is applicable to Herbert, an action for wrongful death, such
an analysis should not apply to Bolanos, where both the party to the
contract and the nonsignator are alive when the claim is to be pursued. A
wrongful death claim, although statutory, may be considered to be
derivative of the decedent's claim. Reasoning that would bind such a
wrongful death claim would not necessarily apply to a separate claim for
emotional distress when the signator's claim is one for negligence resulting
in medical malpractice.
f. Practical Considerations
Two practical considerations are advanced by the court in Herbert
concerning the binding of nonsignators to arbitration for claims arising out
of a contract for medical services. First, the court considers it impractical
to require the signatures of the heirs of decedent because they are
unidentifiable until the time of death, and they are not likely to be readily
available if they could be ascertained. Second, the court is concerned that
were the potential heirs' signatures required, it would be poor policy to
allow third parties to delay medical treatment to the party in need merely
because of their refusal to sign the agreement. Although the
ascertainability problem is unique to a wrongful death case, the availability
and willingness issues are valid when applied to a case such as Bolanos.
However, these practical considerations beg the very question of whether a
nonsignatory third party should be bound without his or her knowledge or
consent in any form. Certainly, if actual notice were suggested as an
alternative these considerations would be valid. The issue is not one of
87. Herben, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
88. Id. at 481 n.3 (citing Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948);
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440 (1904); Mehegan v. Boyne City G. & A.R.
Co., 141 N.W. 905 (Mich. 1913); Perry v. Philadelphia, B. & W.R. Co. 77 A. 725 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1910); Griswold v. New York & N.E.R. Co., 4 A. 261 (Conn. 1885).
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whether actual notice is a necessity in order to bind parties not receiving
medical services. Indeed, if actual notice were provided to these parties,
there would be no argument over whether they were bound. The issue is
whether third parties should be bound without knowledge or notice of the
arbitration provision, or as in Bolanos, without knowledge of the contract
itself. Thus, these considerations are validly entertained if a decision is
made not to bind nonsignators to the medical services agreement, absent
actual notice.
One method of avoiding these concerns is simply to bind only
those parties with notice of the agreement. Those who are not aware of
the agreement would not be bound. Under such a rule, Mr. Bolanos
would be able to pursue his claim in traditional litigation, while his wife
and child would be bound to arbitration. To hold otherwise is to allow a
nonsignator, indeed someone wholly unaware of the contract provisions, to
be deprived of the right to a jury trial and the ability to bring an action in
traditional litigation." The notion of freedom of contract allows parties
of equal bargaining power to agree to the terms of their transactions. The
converse, freedom from being bound by terms to which one does not
agree, is also forfeited by the Bolanos reasoning.
However, those who would share in the benefits of a transaction
must also experience some of the costs. In Doyle and Hawkins the parties
who did not wish to be bound by the arbitration agreement, the child and
wife, both received direct benefit from the medical services contract which
contained the arbitration agreement. April Doyle was the direct recipient
of the medical services, and Ms. Hawkins was provided health services
under the insurance contract along with her husband. This direct benefit
argument will be developed further in the subsequent section and in the
89. In reasoning that it would be impractical and unreasonable to allow one party to
deny another access to medical services merely due to their lack of consent, the Gross court
states that "it would be impermissible to adopt a rule . . . that would permit one spouse to
exercise a type of veto power over the other's decision." Gross, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 827 (Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1988). However, this is exactly what happens to the nonsignator when he or
she is either unaware or does not consent to the provisions of the contract and the signator
"vetoes" some of the rights, and the courts uphold this ability.
It must be remembered that when the court states that one party would exercise a
veto power over the other's ability to obtain medical services, it is only due to the health care
provider's unwillingness to provide these services absent concessions from the patient and
other parties. Under the Gross and Bolanos decisions the power of the health care provider
to reject service absent these concessions, a right undisputed here, is held to be more
important than the third parties' right to be free from limitations on their ability and on the
forum in which claims may be pursued. If this balancing were done with the proviso that the
third party must be a beneficiary of the services, this note would agree that an appropriate
balancing has been achieved. However, this has not been achieved in cases such as Hawkins,
as will be seen in the subsequent sections.
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analysis of Division Four's decisions in Baker and Rhodes v. California
Hospital Medical Center.90
g. Other Considerations
The Herbert court rejects the plaintiff's contention that the
arbitration provision violates the constitutional and statutory provisions
protecting the right to jury trial by stating that "neither decision nor policy
calls for an explicit waiver of the parties' right to jury trial . . . ."
However, in Madden and Herbert, the parties bound to the agreement both
received direct benefit from the health care contracts. In Herbert, the
plaintiff's husband was a Teamster, and the union obtained the contract for
coverage of its union members and their families. The Herbert court cites
§1295 of the California Civil Code as recognizing arbitration as a forum
for handling wrongful death claims.' Although it cites §1295, it is only
from an annotation to Hawkins that this section provides insight into how
wrongful death cases should be decided. Although wrongful death actions
may be very appropriately brought and resolved in an arbitration forum, it
is important to realize that Bolanos did not involve a wrongful death
claim, although the Bolanos court adopted the Gross and Herbert
decisions, which include just such a wrongful death argument.
2. Baker v. Birnbaum
Now that the approach of Divisions Two and Five in regard to the
issue of binding nonsignators has been addressed, it is necessary to
examine Division Four's reasoning. In Gross, Division Two identified
Baker as the point at which the California courts of appeal split in their
decisions pertaining to the binding of nonsignator claims to arbitration. In
Baker, the nonsignator spouse's claim was not bound by the binding
arbitration agreement in the contract for medical services.'
Baker involved a claim by a husband for loss of consortium due
to injuries his wife sustained as a result of Dr. Bimbaum's alleged
negligence during a breast implant removal.' The issue facing Division
Four of District Two was "whether a spouse who signs an agreement to
90. Rhodes v. California Hosp. Medical Ctr., 143 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1978).
91. Herbert, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 480 (citing Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. 131 Cal.
Rptr. 882 (1976)),
92. Herbert, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
93. Baker v. Birnbaum, 248 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988).
94. Id.
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arbitrate her medical malpractice claims thereby binds a nonsignatory
spouse to arbitration when the medical services for which the signatory
spouse contracted were for herself only. "' The court considered Baker
to be governed by its decision in Rhodes v. California Hospital Medical
Center,' which held that the policy favoring arbitration does not extend
to persons who are neither parties to the contract nor have authorized
someone to contract on their behalf'
In support of this decision, the court cited Wheeler v. St. Joseph
Hospital, which held that "[a] party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a
dispute he has not agreed to submit. " Wheeler derives its support for
this position from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. and the
California Supreme Court's decision in Freeman v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., both of which indicate that a party should not be
bound to arbitration unless he or she agrees to be bound."
In Baker, the appellant, Dr. Birnbaum, relies directly on Hawkins
as a controlling case. The court in Baker distinguishes between the
situation in Hawkins and the one before it, by showing that Hawkins
considered its facts "equal" to those of Madden, where the husband was
empowered to contract for his wife. Conversely, the facts in Baker show
that the wife contracted for the services "solely on her own behalf. " 1 °
In fact, Hawkins itself distinguishes Rhodes (and therefore Baker) on the
basis that Rhodes involved an individual contract and not a group health
plan."'1 It seems appropriate at this point to inject the statement of the
California Supreme Court in Madden that "[p]ersons entering into
arbitration agreements know and intend that disputes arising under such
agreements will be resolved by arbitration . . . ."" Even considering
this language, Madden involved an employee who received a benefit,
95. Id. at 337.
96. Rhodes v. California Hosp. Medical Ctr., 143 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1978).
97. Id.
98. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (Ct. App. 1976).
99. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583
(1960); Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1975).
100. Baker v. Birnbaum, 248 Cal. Rptr. 336, 337 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988).
101. In Hawkins, the court explicitly stated that "we cannot agree with petitioner's
contention that Rhodes is 'on all fours' with the case at bench. Rhodes involved an
individual patient contracting for medical services for herself whereas in the instant case the
husband contracted for health care services for himself and his wife." Hawkins, 152 Cal.
Rptr. at 494 (emphasis added).
102. Madden, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (emphasis added).
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health insurance, when her agent, the union, obtained coverage for her
while contracting with the Kaiser Health Plan.
The key factor which separates the reasoning of the Fourth
Division in Rhodes and Baker, from Madden and Hawkins, appears to be
whether the direct benefit of the contract is to be received by the signator
alone, or by both the signator and the nonsignator. Those who are to
benefit directly from the contract, such as the child in Doyle, should bear
the cost of being bound by the arbitration provision. Those who receive
no direct benefit (i.e., medical services), such as the adult children in
Herbert or Mr. Bolanos, should not bear the cost of being bound by an
arbitration agreement of which they have no knowledge. In Madden and
Hawkins, the bound parties received direct benefit, health care coverage,
from the health care insurance contracts containing the arbitration
agreement. In Rhodes and Baker, the nonsignators received no such direct
benefit; rather they received an indirect benefit, the care provided to their
spouses.
Apparently, the Fifth Division of the California Court of Appeals
declines to recognize the distinction made in Rhodes and Baker. Division
Two in Gross, and subsequently Bolanos, bound parties who did not
receive a direct benefit from the contracts involved in those cases. In
doing so, Division Two improperly relied on the Hawkins opinion.
Hawkins expressly distinguished itself from Rhodes because Rhodes
contained facts very similar to Gross and Bolanos, namely that the
signators were obtaining health services solely for themselves. It appears
that the Second and Fifth Divisions have decided to rely on the rule
established by Division Five in Herbert, rather than follow Baker and
recognize Hawkins' valid distinction. Further, the Hawkins distinction
appears to be required considering the California Supreme Court's
discussion in Madden. Again, Hawkins, the case upon which Divisions
Two and Five place so much reliance, specifically distinguishes itself from
facts very similar to those arising in the cases that subsequently rely upon
it.
D. An Overview of the Case Law Development
The following diagram is provided to summarize the preceding
discussion.
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Doyle v. Giuliucci
California Supreme Court (1965)
(parent may bind child)
I
Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp.
California Supreme Court (1976)
(agent may bind principal)
I
Rhodes v. Ca. Hosp. Med. Or.
Court of Appeals, Division 4 (1978)
(husband's wrongful death action not
bound to arbitration by wife's binding
arbitration agreement entered into to
provide services for herselj
Hawkins v. Superior Court
Court of Appeals, Division 2 (1979)
(wife's wrongful death action bound
under arbitration provision in
health care contract providing coverage
to both parties)
Herbert v. Superior Court
Court of Appeals, Division 5 (1985) I
(decedent may bind non-minor
children's wrongful death
action due to Hawkins, even where
children received no benefit under
the insurance contract)
Gross v. Recabaren, M.D.
Court of Appeals, Division 2 (1988)
(adopts Herbert as the appropriate rule
and binds wife's loss of consortium
claim where husband entered into
contract with physician for services
only for himselJ)
Baker v. Birnbaum
Court of Appeals, Division 4 (1988)
(applies Rhodes to allow husband to pursue loss of
consortium claim in traditional litigation where
his wife contracted for medical servicesfor
herself only)
Bolanos v. Khalatian, M.D.
Court of Appeals, Division 2 (1991) (applies Gross to bind husband's emotional distress
claim arising from medical services provided under contract containing binding arbitration
provision entered into solely by wife)
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E. The Appropriate Test
As can be seen from the preceding discussion and diagram of the
evolution of cases, the Fifth Division departed from apparently sound
reasoning when it misapplied Hawkins to bind persons who receive no
direct benefit from a health services contract to the terms therein. When
Hawkins explicitly distinguishes itself from a Rhodes-like situation where
the signator contracted for services solely for him or herself, it can only
be suspected that Divisions Two and Five are taking into account other
reasons for binding the parties involved.
Neither division identifies this apparent misapplication of
Hawkins. However, it is possible that the overriding concern that health
care providers be able to obtain medical malpractice insurance, combined
with the concern that persons be able to obtain services from these
caregivers (who are under no initial obligation to provide such care), has
led these divisions to apply binding arbitration agreements to third parties
in order to further the availability of care and malpractice coverage.
It appears necessary, however, to explicitly consider the interests
at stake, when outcomes such as those reached by Divisions Two and Five
are apparently evolving into doctrine. The two divisions appear to be
balancing two different interests. On one side are the nonsignator's
constitutional right to jury trial, and the general "freedom of contract" idea
that those not parties to a contract are not bound by its terms. On the
other side are MICRA's policy of controlling costs for physicians'
malpractice premiums enacted in the midst of a malpractice "crisis" and
the questionable idea that people are more quickly and more adequately
compensated in arbitration proceedings.
Empirical evidence has only recently become available concerning
the effectiveness of many of the tort reforms enacted during the 1970s and
1980s. For this reason, courts should hesitate to expand a doctrine which
deprives parties of both constitutional and contractual rights under the
banner of furthering the policies of these reforms. When presented with
the divergence in opinion apparent in the California appellate courts, the
wise choice is to choose that doctrine which has developed consistently
from precedent containing non-distinguishable factual situations. The
Fourth Division's Rhodes doctrine provides the basic rule.
As developed by this Note, the rule could be presented as
follows. If any of the following criteria are met, the nonsignator to the
contract is bound: (1) If the nonsigator is in a principal-agent or in
another fiduciary relationship with the siguator party where the
relationship exists for the purpose of entering into agreements for medical
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services;" or (2) where the nonsignator receives a direct benefit from
the contract for health services, such as the delivery of medical care to
him or herself, as in the case of children or an incapacitated
individual,'" or receives health insurance coverage, as where spouses
provide each other with medical insurance." Otherwise, the general
rule that persons not parties to a contract are not bound by its terms would
apply. 10
6
V. CONCLUSION
We are in a lull between the medical malpractice "crises" which
have given rise to the legislation and responses by health care providers
discussed herein. In fashioning a judicial rule to apply to legislation
authorizing binding arbitration agreements in contracts for medical
services, it is possible to have a profound effect on the legislation's
impact. In considering the cost containment goals the legislation is meant
to achieve, other goals - those of our civil justice system - must also be
examined. While we are in this lull, we possess valuable time for
rational, objective consideration of the interests at stake when we consider
binding persons to contract terms of which they are unaware. The
foregoing discussion attempts to provide such objective analysis, and the
rule discussed seeks to achieve the twin goals of protecting the individual
while giving effect to rational, necessary legislation.
David M. Ward
103. Id.
104. Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d I (Cal. 1965).
105. Hawkins, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
106. Rhodes v. California Hosp. Medical Ctr., 143 Cal. Rptr. 59, at 61 (Ct. App. 2d
Dist. 1978); Baker v. Birnbaum, 248 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988).
